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INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954: LEGISLATIVE
AND ADMINISTRATIVE TECHNIQUES
RALPH H. DWAN*
In 1938 Mr. Feidler and the present writer published in this
Law Review' a study of the Federal Statutes from an historical and
technical point of view. The great dividing point, it was shown, was
the Revised Statutes of 1873, the one and only general revision of all
Federal permanent public statutes enacted as law. That is still true,
since the United States Code is only prima facie the law. 2 However,
an increasing number of particular parts of the Federal Statutes
have been enacted "into law," as revisions.3 In 1938 there were only
two, the Criminal Code4 and the Judicial Code.5
That article also discussed certain techniques for finding the
Federal Statutes and for using legislative history as an aid to in-
terpretation. One of the tools referred to6 was Scott and Beaman,
Index Analysis of the Federal Statutes (1908). The second co-
author is the late Middleton G. Beaman, who, during the '20s, '30s
*Of the District of Columbia Bar; also member of the Minnesota Bar;
formerly Assistant Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service.
1. Dwan and Feidler, The Federal Statutes-Their History and Use,
22 Minn. L. Rev. 1008 (1938).
2. 44 Stat. 777 (1926), Dwan and Feidler, supra note 1, at 1021.
3. In the Preface (dated May 1, 1953) to the 1952 edition of the United
States Code, it is stated:
"Inasmuch as many of the general and permanent laws which are
required to be incorporated in this Code are inconsistent, redundant,
archaic and obsolete, there has been inaugurated a comprehensive project
of revising and enacting the Code, consisting of 50 titles, into positive law,
title by title. In furtherance of the plan bills have been enacted to revise,
codify and enact into positive law Titles 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 14, 17, 18, 28, and 35.
In addition, bills relating to other titles are also being prepared for
introduction at an early date. When this work is completed all the titles
of the Code will be legal evidence of the general and permanent law and
recourse to the numerous volumes of the Statutes at Large for this pur-
pose will be unnecessary.
The Law Revision Counsel of the House Judiciary Committee advises that
Title 13 has since been enacted into positive law. Pub. L. No. 740, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. (Aug. 31, 1954).
4. 35 Stat. 1088 (1909) ; see Dwan and Feidler, supra note 1, at 1018.
The present version is Title 18, U. S. C.; see Judge Alexander Holtzoff's
interesting preface in 18 U. S. C. A.
5. 36 Stat. 1087 (1911) ; see Divan and Feidler, supra note 1, at 1018.
The present version is Title 28, U. S. C.
6. Dwan and Feidler, supra note 1, at 1024.
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and '40s, was Legislative Counsel for the House of Representatives.
He was recognized as a master craftsman in the drafting of statutes,
particularly internal revenue statutes. He was also generous in
training others in that difficult art.
In 1947 this writer carried forward the study7 with particular
reference to the internal revenue statutes and regulations issued
thereunder. By that time the Internal Revenue Code had been
"enacted into law," on February 10, 1939, and had been printed as
Part 1 of Volume 53 of the Statutes at Large. It was pointed out
that the subsequent practice as to changes was (with few exceptions)
to make such changes by amendments to particular sections of the
Code or additions of new sections. That practice has continued
until the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.8 In order
to distinguish the two Codes, the enacting statute provides at the
outset:
"(a) Citation.-
(1) The provisions of this Act set forth under the heading
'Internal Revenue Title' may be cited as the 'Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1954.'
(2) The Internal Revenue Code enacted February 10, 1939,
as amended, may be cited as the 'Internal Revenue Code of
1939.'"
At this point, an important difference in purpose between the
two Codes should be emphasized. In the preface to the official version
of the original 1939 Code, it was stated:
"These statutes are codified without substantive change and
with only such change of form as is required by arrangement
and consolidation. The title contains no provision, except for
effective date, not derived from a law approved prior to Janu-
ary 3, 1939."
In that respect the 1939 Code was like the Revised Statutes of 1873.9
On the other hand, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is in large
part a deliberate change of substance; and even where no substan-
tive change was intended, the changes of form are often quite exten-
sive. Then, too, the structural rearrangement is very great indeed.10
For some time to come, the older lawyers will think of Section 22 (a)
of the old Code for the general definition of gross income and will
then try to remember the new section or will look in the excellent
tables in the back of the new Code; the younger lawyers will think
at once of Section 61 (a) of the new Code, with its fuller enumera-
7. Dwan, Some Technical Aspects of the Internal Revenue Statntes and
Regulations, 28 Minn. L. Rev. 377 (1944).
8. Pub. L. No. 591, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 16, 1954).
9. Dwan and Feidler, mpra note 1, at 1013.
10. See Silverstein, An Introduction to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, N. Y. U. 13th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 7, 14 (1955).
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tion and with the catch-all clause at the beginning. The enacting
statute of the 1954 Code also provides:
"(b) Publications.-This Act shall be published as volume
68A of the United States Statutes at Large....
(c) Cross Reference.-For saving provisions, effective date
provisions, and other related provisions, see chapter 80 (sec.
7801 and following) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
(d) Enactment of Internal Revenue Title Into Law.-The
Internal Revenue Title referred to in subsection (a) (1) is as
follows ... "
It will be noted that the enactment "into law" is only by head-
ing. In that connection, Section 7806 provides:
"CONSTRUCTION OF TITLE.
(a) Cross Reference.-The cross references in this title to
other portions of the title, or other provisions of law, where the
word 'see' is used, are made only for convenience, and shall be
given no legal effect.
(b) Arrangement and Classification.-No inference, impli-
cation, or presumption of legislative construction shall be drawn
or made by reason of the location or grouping of any particular
section or provision or portion of this title, nor shall any table
of contents, table of cross references, or similar outline, analysis,
or descriptive matter relating to the contents of this title be
given any legal effect. The preceding sentence also applies to the
sidenotes and ancillary tables contained in the various prints
of this'Act before its enactment into law."
In the previous article on the 1939 Code, there was some discussion
of reliance upon the title of a statute or the heading of a section in
a statute as an aid to construction, and it was shown that such use
is permitted under the more recent cases, including tax cases. 1 The
wide use of section headings in Revenue Acts, starting with the
Revenue Act of 1928,12 has been highly desirable and helpful in the
cases. However, the enacting statute of the 1939 Code contained a
provision similar to Section 7806, quoted above. There was more
reason for such a provision in the 1939 Code because of the desire
not to change the law in any way. In the previous article it was
suggested"3 that the provision did not apply to a heading which
was already in a Revenue Act before the 1939 Code was enacted
and to a heading of a section added by a subsequent Revenue Act.
Similar considerations would seem to apply to Section 7806 of the
1954 Code. At any rate, the hex on headings does not apply to the
heading referred to at the beginning of this paragraph since it is
not part of "this title," i.e., the Internal Revenue Title.
11. Dwan, supra note 7, at 379.
12. Id. at 380.
13. Id. at 379.
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The explicit proscription of giving any legal effect to cross-
references in the new Code is important because the new Code con-
tains many cross-references, which are usually very helpful. They
may be misleading, however, as in certain cross-references at the
end of Sections 351 and 356. Those sections are in the Part on
Corporate Organizations and Reorganizations, but there are cross-
references to Section 2501, a general section on the imposition of
gift taxes, and Section 61 (a) (1), the part of the general definition
of gross income relating to compensation for services. The attempt
to drag in concepts of gifts or compensation in that way and by
statements in the Committee Reports14 almost amount to legisla-
tion by cross-reference and committee report. That is not to say that
the Code is not to be considered as a whole in appropriate cases.
The enacting statute quoted above refers, among other things,
to "effective date provisions." Traditionally Revenue Acts only
apply to certain designated periods or events,15 and the 1954 Code
continues that tradition, with quite elaborate provisions. 16 For years
to come the prior law will govern cases under investigation, in the
process of settlement, and in litigation.
A useful provision in the enacting statute of the 1939 Code was
Section 8, which provided:
"Copies of this act printed at the Government Printing Office
and bearing its imprint shall be conclusive evidence of the origi-
nal Internal Revenue Code in the custody of the Secretary of
State."
The 1954 Code appears to have no corresponding provision.
In view of the considerable changes in the new Code and in view
of the relative speed of its drafting and enactment, there are bound
to be technical mistakes. In fact, it has been necessary already to
remedy by new legislation 1 7 the inadvertent repeal of penalties for
certain violations of the narcotic laws. In the March 24, 1955, Con-
gressional Record"8 the Chairman of the Ways and Means Com-
mittee referred to seventy other mistakes "already" reported by the
Treasury Department. Such post-natal pains find ample precedent
in the history of the Revised Statutes 9 and the United States Code.20
14. House Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., Sd Sess. A117; Sen. Rep No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1954).
15. Dwan, supra note 7, at 378.
16. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7851.
17. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7237, as amended, Pub. L. No. 1, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 20, 1955). See discussion by the Chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee in 101 Cong. Rec. 3116 (March 24, 1955).
18. 101 Cong. Rec. 3117 (daily ed. March 24, 1955).
19. Dwan and Feidler, supra note 1, at 1014.
20. Id. at 1021.
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The careful work of the groups who labored so hard on the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 should not be discounted.2
Changes in the new Code will not be limited to technical provi-
sions. There will also be changes in substantive provisions which
were deliberately adopted.2 2 Already repeal of two of the account-
ing provisions has been considered, largely for revenue reasons.
They will be discussed in another connection ;23 for the present, it
may be noted that the debates have given currency to the wonder-
fully expressive word "blooper.1 24
Looking at the Code more fundamentally, it may be worth-while
to consider the merits, with respect to internal revenue statutes, of
generality as opposed to particularity (or specificity, as they say in
the Customs courts). This does not refer to the problem of prefer-
ential treatment of particular taxpayers or groups of taxpayers
under the guise of more or less general legislation. 25 Rather, the
question presented here is the desirability of spelling everything out
in the statute with a minimum being left for administration. Mr.
Magill and Mr. de Kosmian have touched upon the question in a
recent article,20 particularly with respect to the tax treatment of
grants of scholarships and the like. Under the 1939 Code, such
matters were handled under the broad language of Section 22 (a).
The 1954 Code, in Section 117, has detailed rules on the subject,
e.g., that under certain circumstances the excess over $300 per
month or all amounts received after 36 months are taxable. The
authors seem to prefer less specific rules and thus more flexibility
of administration if the Internal Revenue Service could be trusted
21. See Silverstein, supra note 10, at 8-10, discussing the groups within
the legislative and executive branches of the Government, including the staff
of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, the subcommittees
formed from that staff and from the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service,
and the Office of the Legislative Counsel of the House. See also Darrell, The
Internal Revenue Code of 1954-A Striking Example of the Legislative
Process in Action, 1955 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 1. Mr. Darrell also discusses,
at 16-25, the contributions of groups outside the Government, including the
American Bar Association, the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, and especially the American Law Institute. The American Law Insti-
tute has published a Comparison of the American Law Institute February
1954 Income Tax Draft and 1954 Internal Revenue Code (1955).
22. See Recommendations for Revision of Internal Revenue Code of
1954, Committee on Taxation, Association of the Bar of the City of New York(Feb., 1955).
23. See footnotes 82 and 88 infra and text thereto.
24. See 101 Cong. Rec. 2182, 2184, 2186, 2189 (March 10, 1955) ; 101
Cong. Rec. 2366-2367, 2369 (daily ed. March 14, 1955).
25. See Cary, Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in
Honor of the Departing Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 745(1955).
26. Magill and de Kosmian, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: In-
come, Deductions, Gains and Losses, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 201, 204-206 (1954).
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to take a judicial attitude, but they are quite skeptical on the latter
point. This writer has more confidence in the Service but sees merit
in the specific rules as to amounts and time. There is something un-
seemly about a man making a good living in his regular vocation
for an indefinite time from scholarships without being required to
pay income tax upon such payments, but without a specific statute
it is not possible for the Service to take the dollar and time factors
into account. Likewise, the unsatisfactory situation with respect to
meals and lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer
has been improved by more precise statutory rules in Section 119.27
A much more serious case of too much detail was narrowly
avoided in the corporate reorganization field. A careful job of draft-
ing was done in the Revnue Act of 1924. Section 203 of that Act
set the pattern for later Revenue Acts, with some variations and
refinements down through the years, all were drafted. The courts
added a gloss of substance over form with respect to business pur-
pose and continuity of interests. 28 The fine distinctions between
"split-ups, split-offs, and spin-offs" were largely eliminated in the
Revenue Act of 195 1. 2 9 Into this reasonably satisfactory situation
came the House bill, which proposed sweeping changes designed
to eliminate uncertainties. Fortunately, the Senate took a different
view, which was well expressed in the Committee Report:
"Your committee has substantially recast the provisions of
the House bill dealing with the tax treatment of corporate dis-
tributions and adjustments. Your committee fully shares the
objectives sought to be accomplished in the House bill. It shares
the belief that this part of the statute must be rewritten in order
to provide a degree of certainty which is lacking in existing law.
However, such certainty is not to be achieved at the expense of
the legislative flexibility necessary to provide a statutory pattern
which will tax, in an equitable manner, the myriad business
transactions with which this area of the law is concerned. The
House bill, in the opinion of your committee, contains several
important provisions which, by spelling out detailed rules in an
attempt to achieve almost mathematical certainty, would make
it difficult for necessary business transactions to be carried out
with a minimum degree of intereference from the tax laws.
"The House bill in this area is, in substance, an entirely new
27. The prior law was considered recently in Diamond v. Sturr, 4 1955
P-H Fed. Tax Serv. 1 72,568 (2d Cir. 1955). There the extremely liberal
regulations of long standing prevailed even though a recent attempt had been
made to limit their broad scope by a published mimeograph retroactively
modifying an earlier published mimeograph.
28. Magill, Taxable Income 153-164 (rev. ed. 1945).
29. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b) (11), added by 65 Stat. 493 (1951).
As to the further changes in the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 355, see Sen. Rep.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (1954).
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statute using few of the terms or concepts with which the courts
or the bar have become familiar over the years. Your committee
has sought a less extreme approach. Rather than to replace the
existing statute, it has sought to rewrite it so as to preserve the
terms and concepts of existing law wherever possible. It has,
however, not hesitated to depart from the present statute where
such departure was necessary in order to remove unwarranted
restrictions on necessary or desirable business transactions or to
preclude the use of avoidance devices which have proved success-
ful under the existing code ... 30
The Senate view prevailed, so that the old law, statutory and judi-
cial, was continued in Subchapter C, with some improvements. Ap-
parently it was recognized that brave men lived before Agamemnon.
On the other hand, a clear case in which a great void was prop-
erly filled with detailed legislation in the 1954 Code is that of
partnership income taxes. Even in private law, the traditional com-
mon law case-by-case method of development has never worked
well. Among other things, the aggregate and entity theories could
never be reconciled on a piece-meal basis. It took the Uniform
Partnership Act to adopt definiteiy one theory as to certain problems
and the other as to remaining questions. In the matter of taxation,
the 1939 Code had only a few sketchy provisions on partnership.3 1
The rulings and cases never provided a consistent or even reason-
ably satisfactory pattern. That situation has been replaced in the
1954 Code by the long Subchapter K, which was carefully worked
out on the basis of studies by the American Bar Association and
the American Law Institute.3 2 Here, then, is a clear advance in tax
law by the 1954 Code.
Probably less successful is Subchapter J, on the income taxation
of estates and trusts. Unlike the partnership situation, there was a
highly developed body of law as to estates and trusts before the 1954
Code, and, therefore, there was less need for extensive new legisla-
tion. A little tinkering here and there might well have sufficed. Also,
30. Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42 (1954).
31. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 181-188, 53 Stat. 69-70. See also Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 3797(a) (2), 53 Stat. 469, which defines "partnership" and
"partner." Subchapter K of the new Code contains its own definition of those
terms in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 761 (a-b), but, curiously enough, the old
definitions are repeated in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701 (a) (2) of the new
Code without any cross-references between the two sections.
In view of the form and substance aspects of family partnerships, the
provision on that subject are properly rather general in both Codes: Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 191, added by 65 Stat 511 (1951), and Int. Rev. Code of 1954,§ 704(e). The regulations under § 191 are quite extensive. U. S. Treas. Reg.
118, § 39.191 (1953). They were largely based upon a mimeograph which
preceded the enactment of § 191. See Mim. 6767, 1952-1 Cum. Bull. 111.
32. See Jackson, Johnson, Surrey, Tenen and Warren, The Internal
Revenue Code of 1954: Partnerships, 54 Col. L. Rev. 1183 (1954).
1955]
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it might have simplified things to separate estates from trusts, in
view of the differing functions of those venerable legal institutions,
but with most of the rules being the same. However, events took
another course, and an elaborate new set of provisions was enacted.
As in the case of the partnership provisions, the new sections on
trusts and estates were carefully prepared,3 3 and they should be
given a fair trial, with only a minimum of changes for the time
being.34 The separate treatment of simple trusts and complex trusts
may be helpful, or may generate unnecessary new problems-time
will tell. The new statutory concept of "distributable net income,"
analogous to concepts in the taxation of corporations and stock-
holders, may well be the best contribution in Subchapter J. That
concept not only limits deductions by the estate or trust for amounts
distributed or distributable, but also limits the amounts taxable to
the beneficiaries. The subordinate concept in Section 643 of "taxable
income of the estate or trust" effectively overrules or restricts33
cases like Plunkett,38 Johnstonl,3 7 and McCullough,"5 in which in-
come was attributed to a distributee even though the trust or estate
had no taxable income. The "throwback rule," a term not used in the
Code itself,3 9 is a new attempt to meet the problems raised by ac-
cumulations of a trust which are distributed in a later year. The
Dean case,40 decided in 1939, showed the opportunities for manipu-
lation by shifting the tax burden from the beneficiary to the trust.
The Revenue Act of 1942 limited those opportunities by amending
the 1939 Code4 ' to provide that a distribution within 65 days after
the end of the year is considered to have been made on the last day
of that year, to the extent of the income for the last 12 months of
the period from which the income is paid. Under the new "throw-
back" approach, distributions by a trust in excess of its distributable
net income for the current year are "thrown back" to each of five
preceeding years in inverse order and taxed to the beneficiaries to
33. See Holland, Kennedy, Surrey and Warren, A Proposed Revision
of the Federal Income Tax Treatmint of Trusts and Estates-Amercan Law
Institute Draft, 53 Col. L. Rev. 316 (1953).
34. See Kamin, Surrey and Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of
1954: Trusts, Estates and Beneficiaries, 54 Col. L. Rev. 1237 (1954). A more
critical view is expressed from the standpoint of trust companies n Fleming,
Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates Under the 1954 Code, 32 Taxes 931
(1954) ; see also Farrier, Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates, Oklahoma
Institute on the Internal Revenue Code, 217 (1954).
35. Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 346-347 (1954).
36. Plunkett v. CIR, 118 F. 2d 644 (1st Cir. 1941).
37. Johnston v. Helvering, 14: F. 2d 208 (2d Cir. 1944).
38. McCullough v. CIR, 153 F. 2d 345 (2d Cir. 1946).
39. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §. 665-668.
40. CIR v. Dean, 102 F. 2d 699 (10th Cir. 1939).
41. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 162(d) (3), added by 56 Stat. 810 (1942).
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the extent of the distributable net income of those years not in fact
distributed, with adjustments for taxes already paid by the trust.4 2
This device has considerable merit, on its face at least, but will be
complicated in operation.43 It applies only to accumulations of in-
come in taxable years beginning after December 31, 1953. 44 Hence
there will be ample time to consider the American Bar Association
recommendation 45 of only a two-year throwback, which would keep
the complications within bounds.
From the standpoint of the proper amount of detail in legislation
and in regulations, one of the most interesting parts of Subchapter J,
and indeed of the whole 1954 Code, is Subpart E, which, with few
changes, puts into statutory form the Clifford regulations. The
Clifford case started out in a modest way with a hearing on June 20,
1938, before the Board of Tax Appeals sitting in Saint Paul, Minne-
sota, followed on September 26, 1938, by a memorandum decision of
that tribunal.4 But with the affirmance of that decision by the
Supreme Court,;7 the case became a cause celebre. It will be recalled
that the case involved a five-year trust with the grantor, as trustee,
having "absolute discretion" as to the time of distribution of income
to the wife, and also having broad powers of administration. In
affirming the decision that the grantor was taxable on the income,
the Supreme Court relied upon the broad language of Section 22 (a)
of the Revenue Act of 19344s corresponding to the same section in
the 1939 Code; in the absence of "more precise standards or guides
supplied by statute or appropriate regulations," the Court looked to
the terms of the trust and all the circumstances of its creation and
operation. There followed a veritable flood of litigation. In response
to what were considered to be invitations by the Supreme Court in
the above quotation and in another case,49 and in order to bring
42. Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cnog., 2d Sess. 85 (1954).
43. See the examples, id. at 361.
44. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 683 (a).
45. Hearings before the Committee on Finance on H. R. 8300, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 440-441 (1954).
46. George B. Clifford, Jr., 387 CCH Dec. 10, 446-B (Docket No. 89054,
1938).
47. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940), reversing 105 F. 2d 586(8th Cir. 1939).
48. "'Gross income' includes gains, profits, and income derived from...
professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in
property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or
interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or
the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or
profits and income derived from any source whatever...."
49. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579, 583 (1941). See Eisenstein,
The Clifford Regulations and the Heavenly City of Legislative Intention,
2 Tax L. Rev. 327, 335 (1947).
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some order out of chaos and provide some guidance to draftsmen
and others, the Treasury Department took the bold step of issuing
detailed regulations in 194550 and amended them in 1947.51 The
regulations served their purpose quite well. Their validity was
never fully litigated, although the Court of Appeals of the Seventh
Circuit rendered a vigorous opinion on the subject.5 2 The actual
issue in the case was quite narrow, since the trust was created prior
to the issuance of the Clifford regulations, the trust was extended
before issuance of the regulations so that its total term was ten
years (usually just long enough to protect the grantor from taxa-
tion under the regulation), and the beneficiary was a charitable
corporation. However, the court went out of its way to challenge the
authority for the regulations as a whole and even the authority of
Congress to enact similar rules. The Internal Revenue Service has
announced that it will follow that case only upon the same issue and
facts.0 3 The Congressional Committee Reports ignore the case. It
may well be said, then, that the regulations provided a useful guide,
which could be relied upon, because of the Commissioner's authority4
to apply any new rules without retroactive effect.0 5 Certain it is
that the regulations were largely carried over into the new Code.
There is a temptation to generalize and suggest a pattern for the
future, whereby, in some areas, rules would be consciously tried
out as regulations for a while before enactment into statutory form.
However, recent history hardly supports such a suggestion.
Although the new Code follows the general scheme of the regu-
lations, there are changes here and there, which are important in tax
planning."0 One is the elimination, as a basis for taxing the grantor
on the trust income, of the longer 15-year term provided for in the
regulations in cases where the grantor (or his wife) as trustee has
certain administrative powers over the trust property. There is also
a new 2-year term if the beneficiary is a school of a designated type,
a hospital, or a church. (In that connection, it is noted that the
50. T. D. 5488, 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 19-25.
51. T. D. 5567, 1947-2 Cum. Bull. 9-13; U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, §
39.22(a)-21, 22 (1953).
52. CIR v. Clark, 202 F. 2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953).
53. 1954 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 6 at 5 (1954).
54. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3791 (b), 53 Stat. 467 (now Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 7805(b).
55. The authority has been exercised even when the regulation was
based upon a Supreme Court decision. See Minn. 5968, 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 25,
relating to the first Clifford regulations. See generally Dwan, Administrative
Review of Judicial Decisions: Treasury Practice, 46 Col. L. Rev. 581, 596-598
(1946).
56. See Casner, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Estate Planning, 68
Harv. L. Rev. 222, 227-243 (1954).
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Commissioner is burdened even more than under the old Code with
the application of the term "church" to particular situations.5 )
The evident purpose to limit future administrative discretion in
the Clifford area is shown by the last sentence of Section 671:
"... No items of a trust shall be included in computing the
taxable income and credits of the grantor or of any other person
solely on the grounds of his dominion and control over the trust
under section 61 (relating to definition of gross income) or any
other provision of this title, except as specified in this subpart."
On its face that provision would seem to foreclose general reasoning
like that of the Supreme Court in the Clifford case based on the defi-
nition in the old Section 22(a). And yet the word "solely" suggests
that it will be possible to look back to Section 61 on other grounds,
e.g., assignments of future income. That ground was relied upon in
part in the memorandum opinion of the Board of Tax Appeals in the
Clifford case itself, and the Supreme Court referred to that theory
but declined to examine its applicability in view of the conclusion
already reached for other reasons.
Turning from the Clifford regulations to more humdrum regu-
lations, the new Code, like the old Code, frequently calls for regula-
tions. It has been stated recently that there are 1338 places in the
1954 Code in which the "Secretary or his delegate" is directed or
authorized to prescribe regulations.38 The general provision is in
Section 7805 (a) :
"(a) Authorization.-Except where such authority is ex-
pressly given by this title to any person other than an officer or
employee of the Treasury Department, the Secretary or his dele-
gate shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the en-
forcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may
be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to
internal revenue."
The previous article", referred to the classification (then in
vogue) of regulations in two categories: interpretative regulations
and legislative regulations. The former term is now well established,
but the latter has not been so well received. Mr. Williams, Assistant
to the Secretary of the Treasury, suggests three kinds of regula-
57. As to the attitude of the courts on such matters in non-tax cases,
see Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 Harv. L.
Rev. 993, 1024 (1930); Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 733 (U. S. 1871);
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 121 (1952).
As to the Code provisions, see Garland and Cahill, The Concept of Church
in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 1 The Catholic Lawyer 27 (1955).
58. Williams, The Treastry Department's Regulation Program, 2 Fed.
Bar News 149, 150 (1955).
59. Dwan, supra note 7, at 380-386.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [
tions :60 substantive or legislative, procedural, and interpretative.
Although there is probably some overlapping, the refinement is
useful.
The best example of a substantive or legislative regulation is still
the one on consolidated returns of affiliated corporations.6 ' There
was an attempt in the House bill to handle that complicated matter
by putting all the details in the statute.6 2 Fortunately, wiser counsel
prevailed in the Senate; the reasons are well stated in the Committee
Report:
"The House bill proposed to combine the rules stated in sec-
tion 141 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and in the con-
solidated returns regulations (Regulations 129) and thus place
all of the rules relating to consolidated returns in statutory form.
In view of the fact that desirable flexibility would be lost if this
pattern were followed, and conforming amendments would be
necessary with respect to each change in other parts of the code
relating to income taxes in connection with every amendment
made, your committee has determined to retain the present
pattern in which the Secretary or his delegate pursuant to regu-
latory authority prescribes the rules applicable to the filing of a
consolidated return. Accordingly, your committee has in sub-
stance re-enacted section 141 of the Internal Revenue Code with
modifications.16 3
That advantage of flexibility is important in other connections. But
even regulations are hard to change, and even greater flexibility is
sometimes desirable and obtainable by less formal documents such
as mimeographs.6 4
Procedural regulations are said to deal with "administration"-
apparently such matters as requiring certain forms to be used for
certain purposes.6 5 The facilitation of good forms and instructions
is, of course, of great importance."6
Interpretative regulations, which explain, illustrate and con-
strue, constitute the great bulk of the regulations. In the previous
article, the weight given by the courts to such official interpretations
60. Williams, supra note 58, at 150-151.
61. The regulations under § 141 of the 1939 Code, 53 Stat. 58, were dis-
cussed in Dwan, supra note 7, at 333-386; the later regulations were in U. S.
Treas. Reg. 129 (1951). The corresponding provisions in the 1954 Code are
in Chapter 6.
62. H. R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. Ch. 6 (1954) ; see H. R. Rep. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 87-88, A296-A308 (1954).
63. Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 460 (1954). For changes
made in conference, see Conference Report No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 73
(1954).
64. See, e.g., Mim. 6767, 1952-1 Cum. Bull. 111 discussed Mspra note 31.
65. Dwan, supra note 7, at 384-385.
66. Id. at 383.
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in the form of regulations was discussed.6 7 Mr. Williams quite prop-
erly emphasizes also their importance in day to day administration
of the internal revenue laws. He aptly states:
"Interpretative regulations are of tremendous importance.
They freeze the position of the Government on many questions.
They are the Revenue Agents' Bible. Until and unless a Court
intervenes, the regulations control the position of the Internal
Revenue Service on every issue they resolve .... 68
Since the previous article, the procedure followed in promulgat-
ing regulations has been greatly changed, as a result of the enact-
ment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.69 From the
beginning the policy has been to avoid any narrow, niggardly appli-
cation of the Act and rather to go beyond its express requirements."0
Thus, strictly interpretative regulations are excepted from the notice
procedure71 but it has been the practice not to invoke that excep-
tion. It is gratifying to find the policy reiterated:
"... The Treasury Department believes in the Federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. We make every effort to comply
with it in spirit as well as in form .... ,,72
Under the notice procedure, the practice is to publish a Notice of
Proposed Rule Making in the Federal Register, inviting written
comments within thirty days. (An excellent development beginning
with 1954 is a listing in the weekly Internal Revenue Bulletin of
pending notices.7 3 ) Those comments have always been carefully con-
sidered, and opportunity has been given for hearings. This process
is going on continuously with respect to proposed regulations under
the 1954 Code.74 Thus, the bar and others have an opportunity to
participate in the rule making process, for the benefit of themselves,
their clients, and the public. It is, therefore, surprising, to say the
least, to read in a recent dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court:
"Regulations do not have the safeguard of federal statutory
enactments. Interested parties outside the Internal Revenue
Service perhaps may not be heard. Reports explaining the action
67. Id. at 380-383. See also Lykes v. United States, 343 U. S. 118, 127(1951).
68. Williams, supra note 58, at 151.
69. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U. S. C. §§ 1001-1011 (1952).
The Act was enacted between the original Clifford regulations and the 1947
amendments. The difference in procedure is evident in T. D. 5488, 1946-1
Cum. Bull. 19-25; T. D. 5567, 1947-2 Cum. Bull. 9.
70. See Dwan, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, N. Y. U. Institute on the Federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act and the Administrative Agencies 142, 155 (1947).
71. 60 Stat. 238 (1946), as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 1003(a) (1952).
72. Williams, supra note 58, at 153.
73. It is called "Announcement Relating to Proposed Regulations Pub-
lished with Notice of Proposed Rulemaking."
74. Williams, supra note 58, at 153.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
are not available. Public discussion, such as happens in Congress,
does not take place."7
All will agree with the need for the technical accuracy of regula-
tions, but some may not fully share the current preoccupation with
matters of style.7 6 Short sentences may be generally desirable, but
Macaulay's long sentences are still remembered with pleasure. More-
over, considerable awkwardness of expression would be suffered
gladly if that is the price for more expeditious issuance of regulations
under the new Code.
The accounting provisions of the new Code have been reserved
for the end of these rather discursive remarks, since they pointo up
most of the considerations set forth above. In Sections 41, 42, and
43 of the 1939 Code and similar sections in prior Revenue Acts,
certain general rules were stated, and the Commissioner seemed to
be given broad authority to prescribe permissive or mandatory ac-
counting methods as to particular situations or classes of cases, by
specific rulings, more general rulings or regulations. Thus, the
regulations have long permitted alternative methods of accounting
with respect to certain long-term contracts.7 7 On the other hand,
the installment basis of reporting income from certain sales was
provided for by statute in 1926,78 after the Board of Tax Appeals,
in one of its early opinions,79 _ad rejected the method provided for
by regulations. The scope of the general accounting provisions was
further restricted by court opinions, notably the opinion of the
Supreme Court in the Security Flour Mills case. 0 This unfortunate
history"" resulted in an administrative timidity in this field in sharp
contrast to the boldness shown in the Clifford regulations. In the
process of enactment of the 1954 Code, it was thought necessary not
only to continue the general accounting provisions82 but also to cover
certain accounting matters by express provision, notably Section
75. CIR v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U. S. 187, 206 (1954) (effect of
reenactment of a statute after adoption of a regulation). See Dwan, supra
note 7, at 382-383.
76. See Williams, supra note 58, at 152.
77. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.42-4 (1953) and like provisions in prior
regulations.
78. Revenue Act of 1926, § 212, 43 Stat. 267.
79. B. B. Todd, Inc., 1 B. T. A. 762 (1925) ; see also Blum's, Inc., 7
B. T. A. 737, 752 (1927).
80. Security Flour Mills Co. v. CIR, 321 U. S. 281 (1944).
81. See the thoughtful article; on accounting under the law prior to the
1954 Code by Mr. Herman T. Reiling, Assistant Chief Counsel, Internal
Revenue Bureau: Tax Accounting and Abormnal Income, 30 Taxes 409(1952) ; Practical Legal Aspects of Tax Accounting, 30 Taxes 1028 (1952);
Tax Accounting for Repricing and Other Reserves, 31 Taxes 990 (1953).
82. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 446, 451, 461. See Austin, Surrey, War-
ren, and Winokur, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Tax Accounting, 68
-arv. L. Rev. 257, 259-261 (1954).
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452 (prepaid income) and Section 462 (reserves for estimated ex-
penses). If any specific legislation was called for, a grant of authority
to the Commissioner would have been ihe best legislative device,
leaving to the Commissioner the freedom to permit variations from
the usual cash and accrual ccounting only when really needed and
under proper controls. Instead, the sections went into considerable
detail, and the proposed regulations8 3 imposed strict requirements,
apparently in an effort to keep things within bounds. Recently, the
legislative branch has entered the picture again. On February 24,
1955,84 it was stated on the floor of the House that Section 462
would give a "windfall" to business because of a double deduction.
A bill to repeal that section was introduced."' Some correspondence
then ensued between the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chair-
man of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representa-
tives, with respect to Section 462 and also Section 452. Part of the
Secretary's letter of March 7, 1955,88 is quoted because it shows,
among other things, the relationship between the statute and the
proposed regulations:
"The objective of these sections was simply to conform tax
bookkeeping with business bookkeeping. They never were in-
tended to cover innumerable items some taxpayers apparently
intend to claim. If permitted to remain in the law, they will cause
a greater loss in revenue than estimated and cause considerable
litigation. We are not able to adequately correct this by regula-
tion. Accordingly, I recommend that the two provisions cited
immediately above be repealed retroactively to their original
effective dates."
A further explanation by the previous Chairman appears in the
Congressional Record of March 8, 1955,87 and the matter was
vigorously debated on the floor of the House.8 A bill, H. R. 4725,
repealing the two sections retroactively, but with certain minor
saving provisions, passed the House on March 24, 1955. An
interesting part of the Committee Report is a letter of March 22,
1954, from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Chairman. The
letter reads, in part:
"I assure your committee that if H. R. 4725 as reported out
by your committee is enacted, as I earnestly hope it will be, the
Treasury Deprtment will apply revenue ruling 54-608 (relating
83. Federal Register, Jan. 21, 1955; CCH f" 36,134.
84. 101 Cong. Rec. 1734 (Feb. 24, 1955).
85. H. R. 4451, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) ; see 101 Cong. Rec. 1845
(Feb. 25, 1955).
86. 101 Cong. Rec. 2187 (Mar. 10, 1955) ; also in the House Committee
Report on H. R. 4725, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
87. 101 Cong. Rec. A1520 (Mar. 8, 1955).
88. Committee Report on H. R. 4725, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
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to the accrual of vacation pay) only to taxable years ending
after December 31, 1955.
"Furthermore, the Treasury Department will not consider
the repeal of section 452 as any indication of congressional intent
as to the proper treatment of prepaid subscriptions and other
items of prepaid income, either under prior law or under other
provisions of the 1954 code. In other words, the repeal of section
452 will not be considered by the Department as either the ac-
ceptance or the rejection by Congress of the decision in Beacon
Publishing Co. v. Commissioner (218 F. 2d 697, C. A. 10,
1955) Il or any other judicial decisions."
As this is being written, the matter is pending before the Senate.
Regardless of the outcome, the events on the House side have been
stated at some length to show the vitality of our governmental
system and the close relationship which can exist between the legis-
lative and executive branches on technical matters.
CONCLUSION
In spite of the numerous changes in specific rules, changes in
phraseology, and extensive rearrangement, the new Code is readily
recognizable by one familiar with the old Code. Dean Pound has
distinguished between law and laws and has observed that a Coke
would find modem rules different but would be at home in the
ways of thinking of modem lawyers. Even more, a Beaman would
perhaps be surprised by some of the provisions in the new Code
but would have no difficulty in seeing their relationship to the
old Code and older Revenue Acts. Plus ca change, plus c'est la
meme chose.
Moreover, the problem of generality versus particularity in
statutory drafting remains, and a similar, though less serious, prob-
lem carries over into the regulations. There is still ample room for
rulings (at the request of taxpayers, or otherwise) in specific
matters, which may later be published as Revenue Rulings, and for
closing agreements,90 as well as for more general published rulings
on matters not appropriate or ready for regulations. Concepts such
as fraud and business purpose defy statutory definition. Others like
employment and earnings and profits can be defined only in part.
Detailed rules were called for and enacted in the partnership field,0 '
89. The Beacon Publishing Company case held, one Judge dissenting,
that sums received as prepaid newspaper subscriptions were properly de-
ferred (to be spread over the unexpired subscription periods) by the tax-
payer who was on the accrual basis, even though similar receipts had been
treated differently in earlier years.
90. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3760, 53 Stat. 462 (now Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 7121).
91. As pointed out in note 31, the provisions as to family partnerships
are necessarily quite general.
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largely for historical reasons. Enactment of the Clifford regulations,
with a few changes, was probably desirable in the interest of even
more certain rules for family tax planning. Detailed provisions
were overdone with respect to tax accounting, where flexibility both
for the benefit of taxpayers and for the protection of the revenue is
highly desirable. Better judgment was eventually shown as to con-
solidated returns.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was the product of many
minds in and out of government.9 2 Those who participated learned
a great deal in the process ;93 they and others will learn more in con-
nection with the issuance of regulations, an activity in which mem-
bers of the bar have ample opportunity to join, giving the Treasury
Department the benefit of their experience and judgment. Proposals
for amendments to the Code already call for study by the bar. Then
too, there are the numerous "institutes" on the new Code. All this
education may prove to be the most enduring effect of the new Code.
92. See note 21 mipra.
93. See Silverstein, mipra note 10, at 29.

